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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ILLEGITIMACY OF
LAWLESS FOURTH AMENDMENT POLICING
AYESHA BELL HARDAWAY

ABSTRACT
For more than half a century, documented police brutality has affected
communities of color and the American legal system has largely failed to
address it. Beginning with Rizzo v. Goode, Supreme Court decisions have
allowed local police departments nearly unlimited discretion in their policies
and practices. That decision and others demonstrate that the Supreme Court is
misaligned with governmental initiated reforms. The Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which allows the U.S. Attorney General and the
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to investigate law enforcement agencies’
practices and seek injunctive relief against agencies found to have engaged in
unconstitutional policing, has more adequately addressed the problem. The
legislation has resulted in nearly seventy local law enforcement investigations,
which in turn have resulted in forty consent decrees.
While the DOJ has made progress in its attempts to combat police brutality,
the Supreme Court is misaligned with its efforts in three significant ways. First,
the Court’s prevailing Fourth Amendment stop, search, and arrest analysis
encourages rule or policy violations and law breaking by police officers.
Second, despite the Court’s permissive response to officers who disregard
departmental policies and local law, many law enforcement agencies have
engaged in DOJ-initiated reform processes. Finally, the Court disregards the
impact that arbitrary and discriminatory policing has on the ability of police
departments to perform their jobs effectively while police experts and
departments are focused on building legitimacy with marginalized communities.
The dangers posed by this misalignment threaten the progress that DOJinitiated reforms strive to make.
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INTRODUCTION
Police brutality and other abuses against communities of color have been
documented by the federal government for more than half of a century. 1
Historical documentation of local law enforcement attacks on Black
communities extend back to the American Reconstruction.2 The American legal
system—both state and federal—has largely failed to address the issue. Attempts
by individuals to reform illegal police-department practices have been largely
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.3
The Court usurped federal judiciary attempts to provide injunctive relief to
impacted communities with its pronouncement in Rizzo v. Goode,4 finding the
lower court’s requirement that the Philadelphia Police Department revise its
policies to be an impermissible overreach, despite the demonstration of police
abuses suffered by Black communities.5 Specifically, the Court was of the mind
that local governments should be granted “the widest latitude”6 to manage the
internal workings of their police departments—without interference from the
federal government or from individuals seeking to protect the life and liberty of
those targeted by police brutality and misconduct. In its reversal, the Court cited
a lack of congressional intent regarding the injunctive reach of § 1983.7 Some
fifteen years after Rizzo, news outlets across the globe replayed video footage of
Los Angeles Police Department officers brutally beating Rodney King on a Los
Angeles highway.8
Congress responded by enacting the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994.9 The relevant statute authorizes the U.S. Attorney
1
See generally NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
2
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
261-62 (1988); Eric Foner, A Visual Timeline of Reconstruction: 1863-1877, DIGITAL HIST.,
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/exhibits/reconstruction/timeline.html [https://perma.cc
/6R5H-H3U6] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020); T.W. Gilbreth, The Freedmen’s Bureau Report on
the Memphis Race Riots of 1866, TEACHING AM. HIST., https://teachingamericanhistory.org
/library/document/the-freedmens-bureau-report-on-the-memphis-race-riots-of-1866/
[https://perma.cc/9VW9-H8ZJ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
3
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 365-67 (1976) (reversing district court’s equitable remedy
imposing new citizen complaint mechanism on Philadelphia police).
4
423 U.S. 362 (1976).
5
Id. at 379 (concluding that district court order impermissibly interfered in city affairs by
“significantly revising the internal procedures of the Philadelphia police department”).
6
Id. at 378.
7
Id. at 376.
8
See generally, e.g., The Viral Video That Set a City on Fire, CNN (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2017/04/28/rodney-king-la-riots-25th-anniversary-viraltape-orig-nccorig.cnn.
9
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (recodified at 34 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12643 (2018)); see also Avidan Y. Cover,
Revisionist Municipal Liability, 52 GA. L. REV. 375, 401 (2018) (discussing Rodney King
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General to investigate law enforcement agencies’ practices. It also allows the
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to seek injunctive relief against those
agencies found to have engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
policing.10 Scholars have explored some shortcomings of the legislation.11
Nevertheless, it currently stands as an important tool of the federal government
to respond to systemic issues of excessive force and the illegal stops, searches,
and arrests that have disproportionately led to the loss of Black lives. 12
The DOJ has investigated sixty-nine local law enforcement agencies since the
passage of the law.13 As a result of those investigations, forty jurisdictions have
entered into settlement agreements—commonly referred to as consent decrees—
with the federal government to implement structural reforms designed to rectify
their illegal police practices.14

incident as impetus for DOJ’s oversight power). However, the relevant portion of the Act does
not provide a private right of action like the one sought by the plaintiffs in Rizzo. 34 U.S.C.
§ 12601.
10
34 U.S.C. § 12601(b) (authorizing Attorney General to file civil action to “obtain
appropriate equitable and declaratory relief” to eliminate pattern or practice of law
enforcement conduct that deprives persons of constitutional rights).
11
See, e.g., Cover, supra note 9, at 376; Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform
Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1384, 1388 (2000) (proposing amendment to pattern-and-practice litigation that permits
DOJ to deputize select private citizens to seek injunctive relief for persistent police abuses);
Kami Chavis Simmons, Stakeholder Participation in the Selection and Recruitment of Police:
Democracy in Action, 32 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 7, 18-19 (2012).
12
Joshua Chanin, On the Implementation of Pattern or Practice Police Reform,
CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. JUST. L. & SOC’Y, Dec. 2014, at 38, 51; Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting
Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (2009)
(acknowledging progress § 14141 makes possible and proposing proactive litigation and
incentive strategy to promote widespread reform); Samuel Walker, Institutionalizing Police
Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. LOUIS PUB.
L. REV. 57, 74-75 (2012); Joe Domanick, Police Reform’s Best Tool: A Federal Consent
Decree, CRIME REP. (July 15, 2014), https://thecrimereport.org/2014/07/15/2014-07-policereforms-best-tool-a-federal-consent-decree/ [https://perma.cc/KW2L-DMBZ] (observing
that department loyalty prevents large police departments from self-investigating); John
Worrall, Opinion, Data Show Consent Decrees Worth Their Costs, BALT. SUN (June 12, 2017,
10:50 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op-0613-consent-decree20170612-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y2TC-X3LL] (citing research indicating “risk of
litigation in consent decree jurisdictions was reduced between 22 and 36 percent”).
13
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DOJ, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE
POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 3 (2017) [hereinafter DOJ PATTERN AND PRACTICE
REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download [https://perma.cc/5XP8-XLFF].
14
Id. at 3, 20-23 (commending consent decrees as “most effective in ensuring
accountability, transparency in implementation, and flexibility for accomplishing complex
institutional reforms”).
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The implementation process of consent decrees is complex, costly, and
lengthy.15 It is generally a multiyear endeavor that begins as adversarial but
ideally transforms into a collaborative engagement that rectifies the systemic
failures that fostered police abuses and misconduct.16 The creation or revision
of departmental policies and concomitant training are key components of DOJinitiated structural-reform efforts.17 These policies are reportedly developed
based on law enforcement expertise and best practices.18 They are also tailored
to address the specific deficits of each locality. 19 Cities have instituted new
departmental policies on numerous substantive areas of policing, including use
of force, search and seizure, and bias-free policing.20 The overall goal is to
ensure that persons are protected from unreasonable searches, seizures, and
excessive force.21 Policy mandates ideally direct officers on how to perform their
jobs.22
The Court’s Rizzo decision, which rejected injunctive relief as a remedy for
failed police policies, is not the only way the Court has obstructed reform efforts.
More recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that the Court is misaligned
with DOJ-initiated reform efforts. This Essay explores three ways that this
15
Id. at 35 (discussing how judge determines length of decrees, which may last two years
to decade or more).
16
Id. at 18.
17
Id. at 30.
18
Id. at 20 (“The [Civil Rights] Division pays close attention to consensus opinions in the
law enforcement profession regarding best practices for preventing police misconduct.”).
19
Id.
20
The Baltimore Consent Decree describes this as impartial policing. The principles are
the same. Consent Decree at 30, United States v. Police Dep’t of Balt. City, No. 1:17-cv00099 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Baltimore Consent Decree].
21
See DOJ PATTERN AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3. DOJ investigations
discovered a pattern or practice of excessive force in the Baltimore City, Cleveland, and
Seattle police departments. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DOJ, INVESTIGATION OF
THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016) [hereinafter BALTIMORE FINDINGS
LETTER], https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download [https://perma.cc/6YWX6TQS]; U.S. DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE N. DIST. OF OHIO,
INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE 1 (2014) [hereinafter CLEVELAND
FINDINGS LETTER], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments
/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G7F5JXQ]; U.S. DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE W. DIST. OF WASH.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011) [hereinafter SEATTLE FINDINGS
LETTER], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_
12-16-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE9L-5DH3].
22
BALTIMORE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 81 (recommending use-of-force training
and de-escalation training for officer interactions with persons with mental illness or
intellectual disability); CLEVELAND FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 55 (recommending
structural reforms to ensure sergeants effectively supervise officers and monitor risky police
tactics); SEATTLE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 34 (reminding that investigatory stops
should “be based on real indicators as opposed to vague and nonspecific hunches”).
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misalignment is evident. First, the Court’s prevailing Fourth Amendment stop,
search, and arrest analysis encourages rule or policy violations and law breaking
by officers. Second, despite the Court’s permissive response to officers who
disregard departmental policies and local law, law enforcement agencies across
the country have engaged in DOJ-initiated reform processes with an aim toward
policy implementation and training designed to root out arbitrary and illegal
conduct by officers. This work is designed to provide officers with adequate
instruction and to increase legitimacy within the communities they police by
ensuring that wayward officers are held accountable. Finally, this Essay
discusses how the Court disregards the impact that arbitrary and discriminatory
policing has on the ability of police departments to effectively do their jobs while
police experts and departments are focused on building legitimacy with
marginalized communities. The Essay concludes with a brief exploration of the
dangers posed by this current misalignment.
The importance of police rulemaking has not been lost on legal scholars and
policing experts.23 Professor Wayne LaFave and others have explored the
potential positive impact police rulemaking could have on limiting arbitrary
conduct by individual officers.24 LaFave examined whether courts had prompted
departments to engage in rulemaking and if judicial review of any such
regulations found that they served their intended purpose. This scholarship
provides a comprehensive summary of the Supreme Court’s treatment of
internal police policies and makes a strong case for how police rulemaking
coupled with robust Fourth Amendment analysis would ensure that individuals
are not subjected to unchecked and arbitrary searches and seizures.25 However,
the Court’s general reluctance to push for or examine law enforcement
rulemaking in stop, search, and arrest cases calls into doubt the utility and value
of such rules.26
23

However, some scholars have cautioned about the potential dangers of police
rulemaking. Professor Eric Miller has convincingly argued that communities without political
power will be disproportionately harmed by unchecked departmental policies. See generally
Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521 (2015). Of particular
relevance to this Essay, Miller acknowledges that the danger of police rulemaking exists at
least in part because the Court has failed to check arbitrary policing. Id. at 535.
24
See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The
Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication,
89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 451 (1990); Miller, supra note 23, at 535; Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth
Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of the American Poor, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277,
279-82 (2010).
25
See generally LaFave, supra note 24.
26
See id. at 503-05. Stops, searches, and arrests by officers for minor traffic offenses are
the focus of this Essay. I am currently working on another article that explores whether DOJinitiated reform litigation has impacted and in some cases expanded use-of-force policies
within local law enforcement agencies. That article will evaluate how reform-litigation
policymaking differs from existing constitutional jurisprudence that has simply adopted
policies drafted by officers (largely to the officers’ benefit). In this way, my upcoming article
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RULELESSNESS AND LAWLESSNESS

The War on Drugs brought with it the Supreme Court’s dispensation with the
Fourth Amendment balancing test,27 which evaluates the government’s interest
in law enforcement against an individual’s interest to be free from illegal
searches and seizures.28 Since that time, the Court has essentially created an
irrebuttable presumption that the existence of probable cause means the
government’s interest outweighs the interest of the individual defendant. 29
The Court has largely disregarded how out-of-policy searches and seizures
contribute to an ever-expanding social divide in how police interact with
marginalized communities.30 This lack of regard is further compounded by the
fact that the Court is unfazed by the motivations of officers conducting searches
and seizures outside of protocol.31 The vast divide between the unfettered power
of police and the demands from communities impacted by that power has led to
demands for change.32 In response to those demands, Congress enacted § 12601,
will expand upon existing scholarship, including a recent article by Professor Osagie K.
Obasogie and Zachary Newman that explores how federal courts often rely on or defer to selfserving law enforcement policies rather than critically assess what constitutes reasonable
conduct under the Fourth Amendment. See generally Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary
Newman, The Endogenous Fourth Amendment: An Empirical Assessment of How Police
Understandings of Excessive Force Become Constitutional Law, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1281
(2019).
27
See generally Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of
the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1062-66 (2010) (explaining that Whren decision
resulted from pressure of “war on drugs” and reaffirmed Court’s abandonment of balancing
test).
28
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“[T]he permissibility of a particular
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”).
29
Johnson, supra note 27, at 1049 (“None other than Justice John Paul Stevens boldly
observed that ‘[n]o impartial observer could criticize [the] Court for hindering the progress of
the war on drugs. On the contrary, [our] decisions . . . will support the conclusion that this
Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive’s fight against crime.’” (first and
second alterations in original) (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting))).
30
Id. at 1069.
31
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (concluding that Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “foreclose[s] any argument that the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers
involved”).
32
See, e.g., J. David Goodman & Al Baker, New York Officer Facing No Charges in
Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2014, at A1; Robert D. McFadden, Pleas for Peace and
Justice from Pulpits in Dozen Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1992, at B8; Ferguson Unrest: From
Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.bbc.com
/news/world-us-canada-30193354 [https://perma.cc/W6XE-8FB9]; Conor Friedersdorf, A
Tense Denunciation of Tamir Rice’s Killing, THE ATLANTIC (July 20, 2016),
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and the DOJ has periodically intervened to reform problematic law enforcement
agencies. Local departments found to engage in a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional policing have collaborated with police experts and the federal
government to develop new policies.33 The policies are designed to provide
parameters on the appropriate way for officers to perform their jobs and—
ultimately—to close the ever-expanding divide between communities and
police. However, whether the Court will ultimately give any Fourth Amendment
teeth to these revised policies is in doubt, given the Court’s prior disregard of
police orders and procedures.34
The Court has applied cursory analysis and variable weight to the
appropriateness of law enforcement policies and procedures. In fact, the Court
has given great deference to the on-the-ground, discretionary judgment of
officers—regardless of whether their actions have complied with departmental
policy or procedure. The remainder of this Part discusses stop, search, and arrest
cases that highlight how the Supreme Court has: (1) undermined the value of
departmental policymaking, (2) rendered state law meaningless, and (3) ignored
calls to adopt model standards in an effort to remove officer discretion when
deciding whether to effect arrests for misdemeanors.
A.

Whren v. United States

Officer rule breaking has received an unequivocal green light from the
Supreme Court.35 The Court’s approval of the law enforcement action taken in
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/a-tense-denunciation-of-tamir-riceskilling-at-the-rnc/492110/; Hana Kim, Dozens of Community Organizations Pressuring City
on Police Accountability Measures, Q13 FOX (June 21, 2019, 5:28 PM), https://q13fox.com
/2019/06/21/dozens-of-community-organizations-pressuring-city-on-police-accountabilitymeasures [https://perma.cc/MBD6-FE4A] (discussing renewed push from Seattle community
leaders in achieving promised police reforms).
33
See generally DOJ PATTERN AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 13, at 20.
34
The Supreme Court has used the presence of departmental policies to support rulings on
Fourth Amendment parameters. In United States v. Robinson, the Court cited a D.C.
Metropolitan Police General Order that authorized officers to search an individual upon arrest
to support its finding that the search and discovery of illegal drugs during the arrest of Mr.
Robinson did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. 414 U.S. 218, 221-24 (1973). This is
true despite the fact that a full custodial search for contraband, not just weapons, during a
search incident to the arrest expanded the Court’s position in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29
(1968). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260, 265 (1973) (finding that absence of police regulations for full search incident to arrest
had no bearing on constitutionality of search).
35
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has also encouraged officers to disregard
state law. For example, according to the Court in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 167 (2008),
the law that classified Mr. Moore’s operation of a motor vehicle while under suspension
deemed it a nonarrestable offense. He should have been issued a citation. Instead, he was
arrested contrary to state law. The search incident to arrest uncovered illegal narcotics in his
possession. The Supreme Court upheld his arrest and conviction. Moreover, in Atwater v. City
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Whren v. United States36 directly speaks to this validation. In that case, Michael
Whren and James Brown reportedly attracted the attention of Washington, D.C.,
officers because they were “youthful occupants” sitting at a stop sign for more
than twenty seconds.37 Whren was the passenger in a newer-model SUV with
temporary tags in a “high drug area.”38 Those observations prompted the
officers—undercover, in plain clothes, and in an unmarked car—to pursue the
SUV and initiate a traffic stop. Undercover officers were prohibited by D.C.
Police Department policy from issuing traffic citations. 39 The officers’ conduct
violated this policy. Despite the fact that it was not the undercover officers’ job
to conduct traffic enforcement, the Court held that the officers had probable
cause to believe that Brown had violated traffic laws. 40
The most serious charges against Whren and Brown were only discovered
after the officers violated department policy by jumping out of their undercover
vehicle to stop Brown. It was then that they observed illegal drugs in Whren’s
hands. The traffic infractions reportedly observed by the undercover officers
posed no imminent danger to anyone. Instead, plainclothes individuals
approaching a car in a “high drug area” while shouting demands that the
occupants pull over can be reasonably viewed as creating a greater risk of
danger. The Court’s blanket disregard for the prohibition against undercover
traffic enforcement reflected a failure to understand the purpose behind the
prohibition, thereby circumventing any serious analysis of what was reasonable
under the circumstances. The Court prioritized fulfilling its role in the War on
Drugs over rigorously evaluating law enforcement conduct with an eye to
protecting individuals from erratic conduct not supported by police training or
administrative rules.41 The Court made this clear by dismissing police
procedures and rules as “trivialities.” 42 If an officer can “deviate[] materially
from usual police practices” and still have his conduct deemed reasonable, the
Court has given the ultimate judicial green light to rogue, arbitrary policing. 43
Supreme Court approval has moved beyond mere disregard for departmental
policy.44
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001), police arrested a motorist for not wearing her seat
belt while driving her car, despite the fact that she was not eligible for arrest under state law.
The Supreme Court upheld her arrest and conviction.
36
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
37
Id. at 808.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 815.
40
Id. at 810.
41
Johnson, supra note 27, at 1076.
42
Whren, 517 U.S. at 815.
43
Id. at 814; see also David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future
of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 299, 302, 309 (discussing how judicial
support for officers in field makes strides in War on Drugs via traffic stops).
44
See Sklansky, supra note 43, at 317.
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In doing so, the Court unfairly diminishes the authority and purpose of police
policies. Departments provide policies, manuals, general police orders, and
training to officers regarding those orders to provide direction to officers on what
to do in the field.45 That direction includes telling officers how and when to
initiate stops and searches under the Fourth Amendment. As discussed in Part
II, the Court’s willingness to disregard those orders and procedures undermines
police efforts to do two things: (1) improve legitimacy within the community
and (2) ensure accountability among officers.
B.

Virginia v. Moore

The Court has also put its full weight and support behind officers who ignore
state law in order to investigate drug crimes. Sworn law enforcement officers in
Virginia v. Moore46 demonstrated an unabashed disregard for Virginia law.
Detectives stopped David Moore for driving while his operator’s license was
suspended.47 A detective testified at trial that they effectuated an arrest, waited
for the local kennel to come pick up Moore’s dog, and obtained consent from
Moore to search his hotel room.48 They did all of this despite the fact that
Virginia state law only authorized law enforcement to issue a citation for driving
under suspension. The detective’s testimony demonstrated the arbitrary nature
of the arrest and subsequent search. Most importantly, it demonstrated a blatant
disregard for the law. The detective testified that he chose to place his
“prerogative” above the law and that he used the eventual recovery of illegal
drugs to justify his conduct.49
The Court in Moore focused on the need for officers to feel free to make
legitimate arrests.50 That rationale is oxymoronic and defies common sense. The
45

See generally, e.g., SARAH LAWRENCE & CHRISTINE COLE, CRIME & JUST. INST.,
BUILDING CAPACITY: HOW POLICE DEPARTMENTS CAN DRIVE POSITIVE CHANGE
WITHOUT FEDERAL INTERVENTION (2019), http://www.crj.org/assets/2019/08/CJI-ConsentDecree-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LAB-U7DD].
46
553 U.S. 164 (2008).
47
Officers were also wrong about the identity of the driver. They reportedly believed he
was someone else suspected of driving without a valid license. Moore v. Commonwealth, 609
S.E.2d 74, 76 (Va. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d en banc, 622 S.E.2d 253 (Va. Ct. App.), rev’d, 636
S.E.2d 395 (Va. 2006), rev’d, 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Moore, 553 U.S. at 171 (“In a long line of cases, we have said that when an officer has
probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the
balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally
reasonable.”); id. at 175 (“If the constitutionality of arrest for minor offenses turned in part
on inquiries as to risk of flight and danger of repetition, officers might be deterred from
making legitimate arrests.” (citing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351 (2001)));
id. (stating that in Atwater, the Court “found little to justify this cost, because there was no
‘epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests,’ and hence ‘a dearth of horribles demanding
redress’” (quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353)).
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arrest was not supported by law and therefore by its very nature was illegitimate.
The decision further demonstrates how out of touch the Court is with such offthe-books police actions. Judicial opinions supporting those actions undermine
the legitimacy of American policing.
C.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

The Court has also ignored calls for clear policies from the American Bar
Association, law enforcement experts, prosecutors, and defense bars, which
have urged model rules and standards calling for the issuance of citations instead
of arrests for misdemeanor offenses.51 The need for unambiguous policies is
illustrated by the Court’s decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.52
Amici curiae briefs in Atwater argued that clear policies were necessary to
increase officer compliance.53 Clarity would avoid the need for officers to
exercise discretion when deciding whether to arrest for a misdemeanor offense
not punishable by jail time. In Atwater, Officer Turek decided to arrest Gail
Atwater for failing to wear a seatbelt and to secure her children in their seatbelts
while she was driving.54 State law gave Turek this option because the statute
made the offense subject to either citation or arrest. Though the Court deemed
Turek’s conduct “foolish,” it declined to find Turek’s conduct out of line with
Fourth Amendment protections because it had no reason to believe that there
was a national “epidemic”55 of similar conduct. The Court downplayed the need
to protect Atwater from the “pointless indignity” of arrest because her lawyer
could offer only one other warrantless misdemeanor arrest and an amicus brief
mentioned only a “handful” of others.56 In doing so, they refused to affirmatively
protect Americans from those very “pointless indignities.”57 While it is
questionable that the Court appreciated the full universe of warrantless
misdemeanor cases, it is undoubtable that their decision provides cover for law
enforcement to engage in the very conduct the Court admittedly recognized as
foolish. The Justices seem to have underestimated the power of their opinions.
As the dissent in Atwater so aptly predicted, “[t]he per se rule that the Court
creates has potentially serious consequences for the everyday lives of
51

See, e.g., Brief of the Institute on Criminal Justice at the University of Minnesota Law
School & Eleven Leading Experts on Law Enforcement & Corrections Administration &
Policy as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408), 2000 WL 1341293, at *22 [hereinafter Brief in Support of
Petitioners].
52
532 U.S. 318 (2001).
53
Brief in Support of Petitioners at 21-27 (detailing model standard of American Bar
Association, American Law Institute’s Model Code, and Uniform Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
54
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 318.
55
Id. at 353.
56
Id. at 353 & nn.23-24.
57
Id. at 361.
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Americans.”58 And it has. Though there are some distinctions, the Court’s
refusal to engage in a meaningful analysis of individual rights and interests,
while at the same time refusing to place reasonable checks on the motives and
discretion of law enforcement, can be viewed as emboldening police officers.
Plainclothes police officers killed Eric Garner in 2014 for the crime of selling
loose cigarettes to avoid state tax law.59 An officer fatally shot Walter Scott in
the back while Scott was running away to avoid arrest for the minor traffic
violation of driving on a suspended license.60 The Court’s view that Atwater’s
handcuffing, arrest, and brief time in jail were minimally intrusive when
compared to use of force, strip searches, and the like failed to account for the
many in-custody deaths that occur in American jails. The questionable
circumstances of Sandra Bland’s in-custody death in 2015 and of Eric Garner’s
killing a year earlier typify precisely what the Court should have realized in
Whren and Atwater—unchecked police authority leads to extrajudicial deaths.
Interestingly enough, the allegiance to officer conduct continues in its
steadfastness even when the subject officer’s conduct does not comport with
departmental policy. In those instances, the Court has disregarded the
importance of departmental policies. Instead, the Court has chosen to regard the
Fourth Amendment as inflexible and unable to accommodate policies and
procedures that “vary from place to place and from time to time.”61 In short,
when the policy favors the action of the police officer in question, the Court is
willing to factor the policy into its analysis, but when the policy contradicts the
reasonableness of the action in question, the Court dismisses the value or
importance of the policy.
II.

POLICY DEVELOPMENT INTEGRAL TO REMEDYING
PATTERN-OR-PRACTICE VIOLATIONS

Comprehensive policies provide the necessary foundation for how police
departments operate.62 Policies that are properly designed and implemented

58

Id. at 371 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See Goodman & Baker, supra note 32, at A1.
60
Matthew Vann & Erik Ortiz, Walter Scott Shooting: Michael Slager, Ex-officer,
Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison, NBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2017, 12:28 PM), https://www.nbc
news.com/storyline/walter-scott-shooting/walter-scott-shooting-michael-slager-ex-officersentenced-20-years-n825006 [https://perma.cc/WP83-PNPK].
61
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
62
W. DWAYNE ORRICK, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, BEST PRACTICES GUIDE FOR
DEVELOPING A POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY-PROCEDURE MANUAL 1 (2018),
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/BP-PolicyProcedures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F725-CC44]. Policies and procedures have not always been utilized in a
comprehensive and consistent manner in American policing. Scholars identified a dearth of
guidance for officers on how to perform their job duties as a cause for the arbitrary and highly
discretionary method of law enforcement on American streets. See Herman Goldstein, Police
59
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serve a few key functions. First, they primarily inform officers on how to
perform their job duties in a consistently professional and legal manner.63
Second, they provide some assurance to the community being serviced by the
police department that the services they receive are in line with current
standards.64 Third, comprehensive policies provide a mechanism by which to
hold officers accountable for misconduct.65 Finally, policies instruct officers on
the performance of their job duties, but they also set out the disciplinary
parameters for misconduct.66
The absence of established or effective policies and training has been linked
to improper policing.67 Police leadership, the DOJ, and other stakeholders have
engaged in the process of shoring up failing policies and creating new ones
where previous policies did not exist.68 These reform efforts have been prompted
by pattern-and-practice investigations initiated by the DOJ69 to remedy
unconstitutional policing.70 Investigations by the DOJ have ended with sixteen
Policy Formation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123,
1146 (1967).
63
ORRICK, supra note 62, at 1.
64
Id. at 8.
65
See Samuel Walker, Police Accountability: Current Issues and Research Needs 4 (May
2006) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218583.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CZ5-8ZC4].
66
See DOJ PATTERN AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 13, at 5; see also BALTIMORE
FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 139; CLEVELAND FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 34;
SEATTLE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 34.
67
See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DOJ, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE
DEPARTMENT, at xiii (2011) [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS FINDINGS LETTER],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5D4G-HRHG]; Walker, supra note 65, at 10 (discussing how establishment
of clear policies has been shown to reduce “undesirable outcomes”).
68
DOJ PATTERN AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10.
69
See, e.g., NEW ORLEANS FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 67, at xiii (finding that policies
failed to give officers adequate direction on how to conduct stops, searches, and arrests);
SEATTLE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 25-26 (pointing to lack of clear policies and
practices regarding pedestrian stops, with no clear distinction between casual encounters and
investigatory stops); Detroit Police Dep’t Witness Detention Findings Letter from Stephen H.
Rosenbaum, Chief of Special Litig. Section of DOJ, and Geoffrey G. Collins, U.S. Attorney,
to Ruth Carter, Corp. Counsel for City of Detroit § II(B) (June 5, 2002),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/detroit-police-dept-witness-detention-findings-letter
[https://perma.cc/6XFR-Y2GS] (recommending that arrest policies be revised because they
permitted officers to use information gathered subsequent to arrest as basis for establishing
probable cause for same arrest); Investigation of the East Haven Police Department Letter
from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Joseph Maturo Jr., Mayor, Town of East
Haven 1 (Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/19
/easthaven_findletter_12-19-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT28-YZYX].
70
This is not to say that policy creations and revisions in American police departments
occur only when the DOJ is involved. I fully recognize that there are police departments across
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police agencies agreeing to reform their policies and/or practices for stops,
searches, and arrests.71
Those agreements typically come about once the DOJ issues a Findings
Letter.72 Those letters communicate the constitutional violations the federal
government has determined it has reasonable cause to believe have been
committed by a local law enforcement agency. A number of Findings Letters
have flagged the detrimental impact that inadequate and outdated policies on
stops, searches, and arrests have on the quality of police services. In New
Orleans, for example, the DOJ informed city leaders that the brief and stale
information contained in their policy on warrantless searches and seizures lacked
details and explanations necessary to provide officers guidance.73
The New Orleans Police Department is not alone. The Court’s refusal to
recognize the impact of its unchecked support for police conduct has arguably
created rampant practices of discriminatory and unconstitutional policing in
cities like Baltimore. Prior to the current reform efforts, officers in Baltimore
executed a zero-tolerance form of law enforcement that disproportionately
affected Black communities within that city. The zero-tolerance approach
“encourage[d] officers to make large numbers of stops, searches, and arrests for
minor, highly discretionary offenses.”74 Individuals were stopped, frisked, and
questioned for suspicion of loitering in accordance with a departmental policy
that misstated local law.75 When supported by probable cause, the Supreme
Court—stricken by tunnel vision—has validated such destructive practices. 76
the country that actively and independently work to ensure that their policies are up to date,
to include the input and feedback of their members, and to ensure their members are
adequately trained. The points in this Essay only address DOJ-initiated reform efforts.
71
See An Interactive Guide to the Civil Rights Division’s Police Reforms, U.S. DOJ,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/922456/download [https://perma.cc/D2VE-EG4R] (last
updated Jan. 18, 2017) (click “Unlawful Stops, Searches, & Arrests” and then click “General
Policies”) (listing Alamance County, Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, East Haven, Ferguson,
Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, Newark, New Jersey State Police, New Orleans,
Pittsburgh, Puerto Rico, Seattle, Steubenville, and Yonkers). This number captures those
jurisdictions that have entered into binding settlement agreements later adopted by a federal
court as consent decrees. It does not include jurisdictions that may have developed new stop,
search, and arrest policies after receiving technical assistance from the DOJ.
72
DOJ PATTERN AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 13, at 17.
73
NEW ORLEANS FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 67, at 28 (showing that policy was only
four pages long and had not been revised for approximately eight years).
74
BALTIMORE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 40.
75
Id. at 43 (“[The Baltimore Police Department’s] newly adopted order . . . includes a
section discussing special considerations for a violation of the Baltimore City Code
prohibiting loitering, but fails to mention the requirement that officers may not arrest
individuals for loitering until they have been told what specific conduct is prohibited, warned
that a violation of law is occurring, and still refuse to desist.”).
76
See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (holding that when officers have
probable cause to believe that person has committed crime in their presence they can make
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The DOJ has directly linked the absence of police policy guidance within
departments—along with other systemic deficiencies—to patterns or practices
of unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests.77 As a result, the consent decree
between the City of Baltimore and the DOJ specifically prohibits officers from
relying on Whren to engage in pretextual stops.78
This places the DOJ-initiated reform efforts directly in conflict with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Whren.79 This is an exceptional step taken by the
DOJ, and it is not without merit. The agreement singles out the problematic
effect the Whren decision has had on policing and on the lives of those being
policed.80 A plain reading of the relevant section of the Baltimore consent decree
suggests that the prohibition against pretextual stops is designed to prevent
situations like that which resulted in the death of Freddie Gray. 81 Officers are
not allowed to rely on the classification of a community as a “high crime area”
or a person’s efforts to avoid contact with law enforcement as a justification to
initiate an investigatory stop or detention.82 The Court in Whren relied on similar
factors when it rejected the notion that pretextual motivations could negate the
reasonableness of a stop when the stop is supported by probable cause.83
Identifying policy deficiencies and the way those deficiencies have
manifested in the form of illegal police practices is only the beginning of the
process to reform those practices.84 Quality, comprehensive policymaking is a
immediate arrest and search individual); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354
(2001) (“Accordingly, we confirm today what our prior cases have intimated: the standard of
probable cause ‘applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to “balance” the interests and
circumstances involved in particular situations.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979))).
77
BALTIMORE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 3, 40, 129.
78
Baltimore Consent Decree, supra note 20, at 15-16, para. 43(a).
79
Id. (“BPD will prohibit officers from: Conducting pretext stops under Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), in a manner that violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI,
or the Safe Streets Act . . . .”); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
80
Baltimore Consent Decree, supra note 20, at 16, para. 43(a).
81
See id. at 13, para. 38. To be clear, the death of Freddie Gray highlighted the negative
consequences of zero-tolerance and pretextual policing. B ALTIMORE FINDINGS LETTER, supra
note 21, at 19. Community members and organizations worked for several years prior to
Gray’s death to prompt the police not only to change their policies and practices but also to
implement those changes so that individuals were not subjected to stops, searches, and arrests
without the requisite legal threshold of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Id. at 18.
82
Baltimore Consent Decree, supra note 20, at 16, para. 43(e).
83
Whren, 517 U.S. at 808 (detailing presence of defendants in “high drug area” and
assertions by undercover officers that defendants’ car turned “suddenly to its right, without
signaling, and sped off at an ‘unreasonable’ speed” when undercover officers began pursuit).
84
See DOJ PATTERN AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. At this point, an
adversarial posture exists between the parties. A local jurisdiction may disagree with the
findings made by the DOJ and refuse to enter into a settlement agreement. Id. at 19. In that
instance, the DOJ may elect to sue the jurisdiction under 34 U.S.C. § 12601. A federal judge
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multistep process.85 It requires an understanding of the legal issues and
parameters.86 Input and feedback from officers not in management have also
been identified as integral to successful policymaking.87 But departments with
deficient policies should not be presumed competent to do this work alone.88
Collaboration and input from stakeholders in the reform process is essential to
improving the policies as well as the legitimacy of the organization.89 This
requires that additional time and resources are utilized to ensure that this
important work benefits from an appropriately robust process.
III. LEGITIMACY
Law enforcement agencies reportedly strive for “lawfulness” and
“legitimacy.”90 Despite that goal, American law enforcement agencies have a
legitimacy problem within certain segments of the country. The Black Census
Project reported that 84% of respondents in the Black community say that
“police officers not being held accountable for their crimes is a problem.” 91
Additionally, 83% describe excessive use of force as a problem and 73% “agree
that holding police officers responsible for the misconduct would improve
police-community relations.”92 A recent study of nearly 100 million traffic stops
conducted by twenty-one state patrol departments and twenty-nine municipal
police departments provides some data on what may be contributing to that lack

then determines whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional policing. DOJ P ATTERN AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 13, at
20.
85
See Goldstein, supra note 62, at 1128 (outlining numerous steps that police would need
to take to adequately take on policymaking role).
86
Id. at 1127.
87
Id. at 1133 (alleging that if individual officers were involved in promulgation of policies,
“it would serve in a positive way to inform members of a force what is expected of them”);
Walker, supra note 12, at 66 (discussing failure of top-down police-reform strategies).
88
POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, ADVICE FROM POLICE CHIEFS AND COMMUNITY
LEADERS ON BUILDING TRUST: “ASK FOR HELP, WORK TOGETHER, AND SHOW RESPECT” 15
(2016), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/policecommunitytrust.pdf [https://perma.cc
/D63A-FRGT] (“[I]f the community doesn’t believe in you, you are at ground
zero. . . . [Police and the community need to be] able to work through obstacles and work
together on many issues.”).
89
See generally id. at 65 (suggesting various ways community members and police can
work together to “re-establish community trust and legitimacy through engagement,
partnerships, transparency and accountability”).
90
Walker, supra note 65, at 1 (defining legitimacy as “perception that police conduct is
both lawful and consistent with public expectations”).
91
BLACK FUTURES LAB, MORE BLACK THAN BLUE: POLITICS AND POWER IN THE 2019
BLACK CENSUS 13 (2019), https://blackcensus.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/DigitalMore-Black-Than-Blue.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q26L-GJRE].
92
Id. at 8.
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of confidence.93 The study examined traffic stops conducted by those agencies
and found that officers demonstrated racial bias in the performance of their job
duties.94 Researchers first found that officers demonstrated bias when deciding
who to stop.95 The study also found that officers used a lower threshold for Black
and Hispanic drivers when deciding whether to conduct a search.96 The data
gathered and analyzed by this study only confirm what people of color have
known for some time: racial bias is a reality in American policing. 97
The lack of confidence in law enforcement is not limited to communities of
color. A 2015 national Gallup poll found that just over half of Americans
reported having high confidence in the police—the lowest number in twentytwo years.98 The data also align with what the DOJ found when investigating
some jurisdictions for pattern-and-practice violations. 99 In several jurisdictions
across the country, the DOJ found that officers conduct stops, searches, and
arrests in a discriminatory manner.100
Holding officers accountable for misconduct is a key component to improving
legitimacy.101 Officers who violate policy are expected to be held accountable
for failures to comply with policy in a manner that is appropriate with the level
of offense and prior misconduct of the offending officer. To that end, the reform
efforts also involve the development of disciplinary matrixes to hold officers
accountable.102 DOJ-initiated reform efforts have sought to address the issue.103
But addressing the problematic issues of American law enforcement should not
fall solely on the DOJ. Violations of departmental policies have had little or no
impact on the Supreme Court in determining the reasonableness of an officer’s
93

Emma Pierson et al., STANFORD COMPUTATIONAL POL’Y LAB, A LARGE-SCALE
ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN POLICE STOPS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019)
(“[W]e compiled and analyzed a dataset detailing nearly 100 million municipal and state
patrol traffic stops conducted in dozens of jurisdictions across the country . . . .”).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 3.
96
Id. at 5.
97
See BALTIMORE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 5.
98
Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years, GALLUP (June 19,
2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx [https://
perma.cc/HDB9-LH93].
99
See DOJ PATTERN AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 13, at 41-48.
100
Id.
101
Walker, supra note 65, at 1.
102
Id. at 15-16 (discussing use of early intervention systems in some departments to
identify “patterns of problematic conduct,” such as “identifying officers with more serious
conduct problems,” and to correct those problems).
103
DOJ PATTERN AND PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 13, at 30 (“Inadequate systems for
holding law enforcement agencies accountable to communities and individual officers
accountable for misconduct are at the heart of nearly every finding of a pattern or practice the
Division has ever issued. As a result, improving accountability systems occupies a prominent
place in the Division’s reform agreements.”).
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conduct.104 Indeed, the Constitution provides protections that the judicial branch
should make its priority to enforce.
The American judicial system has in large measure failed to hold officers
criminally liable for the deaths of unarmed Black and Hispanic individuals.105
The Court’s most recent stop, search, and arrest decisions are yet another way
in which officers are not held accountable and in which the Court continues to
undermine police legitimacy.106 The consolation offered by the Court that claims
of discrimination can be remedied via the Equal Protection Clause is really no
consolation at all.107 And while it may seem judiciously expedient to enforce
traffic and drug laws against civilians, the cost shouldered collectively by law
enforcement agencies that are viewed as illegitimate and discriminatory has
proven to be great.108

104

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
See, e.g., Katie Benner, No U.S. Charge Against Officer in Garner Case, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2019, at A1; Mitch Smith, Officer Cleared in 2016 Killing of Black Driver, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2017, at A1; Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Jurors Decline Charges in
Death of Cleveland Boy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2015, at A1; Tracy Connor et al., Ferguson
Cop Darren Wilson Not Indicted in Shooting of Michael Brown, NBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2014,
2:21 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/ferguson-copdarren-wilson-not-indicted-shooting-michael-brown-n255391
[https://perma.cc/4SLQWB2N]; Ida Lieszkovszky, Cleveland Police Officer Michael Brelo Not Guilty,
CLEVELAND.COM (May 23, 2015), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2015/05
/brelo_verdict.html; Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with
Zero Convictions Against Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016, 8:57 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-motions-20160727story.html; Steve Schmadeke & Jeremy Gorner, Anger Follows Acquittal in Rare Trial of
Chicago Cop, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 21, 2015, 7:09 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news
/breaking/ct-chicago-police-detective-manslaughter-trial-0421-met-20150420-story.html.
106
Taslitz, supra note 24, at 282.
107
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Sklansky, supra note 43, at 326-27 (discussing how Equal
Protection Clause will not be meaningful vehicle to address discriminatory policing without
showing of explicit racial animus on part of identified officers).
108
See Balt. Sun Editorial Bd., Opinion, Baltimore’s Consent Decree Is Hurting Police
Officer Morale. It’s Also the Solution., BALT. SUN (Aug. 20, 2019, 7:45 AM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-0820-consent-decree-20190820gothfjinebbf3kvhobx6ky4g3a-story.html (“The Fraternal Order of Police has been saying the
same thing . . . for years, and it stands to reason that cultural change on the order the consent
decree requires coupled with the demands of reducing Baltimore’s horrific rate of violent
crime would put enormous pressure on officers.”); Derrick Blakley, How Much Will New
CPD Consent Decree Cost the City?, CBS CHI. (Mar. 1, 2019, 7:46 PM),
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/03/01/cpd-consent-decree-cost/ [https://perma.cc/8CWLBC44] (comparing cost of Chicago consent decree at $25.7 million, including almost $13
million for personnel, to cost of consent decrees for other cities and noting that Baltimore,
Cleveland, and New Orleans spent $10.5 million, $11 million, and $7 million respectively).
105
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The lack of legitimacy also makes it difficult for officers to do their jobs
effectively.109 Unhealthy relationships rife with mistrust between law
enforcement officers and the communities they serve inhibit the information and
insight that officers can gain from critical resources.110 Some law enforcement
agencies have deplorable solve rates for homicides. 111 Community members
who are unable to trust police officers are unlikely to cooperate with
investigations.112
The Court’s refusal to acknowledge and remedy discriminatory police
practices under the Fourth Amendment has helped foster a culture of
unaccountability.113 An essential role of the Court is to provide a check on the
conduct of law enforcement.114 This check is what distinguishes a democratic
nation from a police state.115
CONCLUSION
The Court’s deference to decisions made by officers policing American
streets has resulted in an obvious disregard for the important impact that
comprehensive police policies and procedures can have on law enforcement.
The current spotlight on the disproportionate number of Black men and women
killed by police has prompted attempts to reform many aspects of policing.
Police leaders, experts, and communities impacted by police violence agree that
there exists a need to increase police accountability and enhance police
legitimacy.116

109
See BALTIMORE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 4; Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 286 (2003); Walker,
supra note 65, at 1.
110
See BALTIMORE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 21, at 4 (“[F]rayed community
relationships inhibit effective policing by denying officers important sources of information
and placing them more frequently in dangerous, adversarial encounters.”); Walker, supra note
65, at 1 (explaining that police partnerships with community are “essential ingredient” in
effective policing).
111
See, e.g., Martin Kaste, Open Cases: Why One-Third of Murders in America Go
Unresolved, NPR (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/395069137
/open-cases-why-one-third-of-murders-in-america-go-unresolved [https://perma.cc/MV6TYXK2].
112
Id. (“Since at least the 1980s, police have complained about a growing ‘no snitch’
culture, especially in minority communities. They say the reluctance of potential witnesses
makes it hard to identify suspects.”).
113
Nirej Sekhon, Essay, Police and the Limit of Law, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1711, 1716
(2019).
114
Id. at 1724.
115
See id. at 1753-54 (explaining how Court’s excessive deference to police discretion has
given police power to suspend rights and act as if there were instilled martial law).
116
See LAWRENCE & COLE, supra note 45, at 8.

1212

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:1193

The Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States has been described
as a show of support for law enforcement in the American “War on Drugs.”117
That decision declared that the actual motivations of an officer do not factor into
the constitutional analysis for determining the reasonableness of a traffic stop. 118
In doing so, the Court rejected arguments that would have required courts to
consider if the stated basis of the stop was pretextual. 119 The Court refused to
entertain whether discriminatory assumptions about the criminality of Black
youth should weaken or eliminate the establishment of probable cause.120
Instead, the Justices—in a unanimous decision—went to great lengths to avoid
exploring the question of pretext.121 In doing so, the Court undermined the
legitimacy of law enforcement that it aimed to secure. Specifically, the Court
negated the authority and potential importance of police policies and manuals.122
Whren is not an anomaly in this respect.
The Supreme Court has a demonstrated pattern of disregarding policies for
certain search-and-seizure cases. This is particularly true during face-to-face
officer encounters with people of color.123 Judicial opinions supporting officer
misconduct undermine the efforts of law enforcement in its pursuit of legitimacy
and accountability. This is of renewed importance in light of recent reform
efforts to implement constitutional policing. What was deemed reasonably
prudent and necessary by the Court during the “War on Drugs” era has come at
a significant cost, not only to U.S. citizens but also to policing in America. The
purported gains the Court made in fortifying officers’ on-the-ground crimefighting authority and strategies have led to the current deficits and
unnecessarily deadly encounters in American policing.
Probable cause—for even the most minor offenses—has been used as a
bright-line rule to permit the Court to forgo balancing individual interests against
those of the government.124 The Court presumes that governmental interests are
117

Johnson, supra note 27, at 1075 (“In supporting law enforcement efforts once again in
the ‘war on drugs,’ the Whren Court made any challenge to a pretextual stop close to
impossible under the Fourth Amendment when the stop was based primarily on race.”); see
also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
118
Whren, 517 U.S. at 819.
119
See id. at 814 (categorizing petitioner’s proposed test of “reasonableness” as “designed
to combat nothing other than the perceived ‘danger’ of the pretextual stop” making it
inconsistent with Court’s cases).
120
See id. at 814-15.
121
See id. at 815 (“Petitioners argue that our cases support insistence upon police
adherence to standard practices as an objective means of rooting out pretext. They cite no
holding to that effect, and dicta in only two cases.”).
122
See id. (condoning officer behavior at odds with department policies).
123
See Sklansky, supra note 43, at 317 (“The disregard of racial problems in the Court’s
recent vehicle stop decisions obviously has implications for all of Fourth Amendment law,
not just for the rules governing roadside detentions.”).
124
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 321-22 (2001) (“Thus, the probablecause standard applies to all arrests, without the need to balance the interests and
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superior to individual interests when an officer has probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed.125 This truncated analysis assumes that the
government’s interest will always rest on the side of making the arrest and
enforcing the law, regardless of the arresting officer’s motivation or the triviality
of the offense. Police leaders and experts committed to improving police
legitimacy and avoiding unnecessary use of force on American streets would
categorize the governmental interest differently.
This reflexive and habitual support is evidenced by the enormous deference
given to the manner in which officers have been legally permitted to conduct
traffic stops over the last two decades. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
resulted in the erosion of individual protections related to stops, searches, and
arrests. Officers have been given wide latitude to question a motorist and
inconvenience a motorist’s life, despite the minor nature of the offense.126
Officers have been granted the right to question an individual regarding their
citizenship status and history of drug use.127 They have also been granted the
right to arrest an individual for an offense that has been deemed a nonarrestable
offense under state law.128
The Court’s reflexive and habitual support is also demonstrated by the
conflicting and selective value of importance placed on local policies and
procedures designed to govern officer conduct. A review of the Supreme Court
cases involving an analysis of departmental policies and procedures indicates
that weight is given to the mandates provided by those policies when the subject
officers’ conduct comports with the policy. This holds true even when the
conduct is contrary to existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The outcome
further erodes civilian protections while bolstering the support of law
enforcement and on-the-ground officer decisions. Supreme Court decisions on
stops, searches, and arrests are not aligned with best practices or modern reform
efforts.

circumstances involved in particular situations.” (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
208 (1979))).
125
See id. at 322 (“An officer may arrest an individual without violating the Fourth
Amendment if there is probable cause to believe that the offender has committed even a very
minor criminal offense in the officer’s presence.”).
126
Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 133-37 (2017) (citing cases
establishing legal right of officers to question motorists and others about details, including
where they are coming from and going to, if officers can conduct consensual searches of their
belongings, and immigration status of motorists and companions).
127
See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (holding that officer “did not need
reasonable suspicion to ask [defendant] for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration
status”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (holding that officer may stop and question
individual if they believe the individual may be involved in criminal activity).
128
See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (holding that officer’s arrest was valid
even though state law required that only citation be given for offense).
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This misalignment endangers the ultimate effectiveness of reform efforts. It
encourages departments and officers to go through the motions with an
understanding that the federal courts will uphold searches and seizures contrary
to policy as long as they are supported by probable cause, no matter how
specious. The potential for federal courts to undermine the reform efforts of local
police departments will come at great financial and organizational costs. The
failure of the courts to fully consider the reasonableness of officer conduct will
reinforce the illegitimacy of policing and all levels of government. All the while,
members of marginalized communities will be left to continue suffering
discriminatory and deadly violence at the hands of police.
That suffering is demonstrated in many ways, including pervasive and
widespread police abuses—in some instances captured by video—in the form of
the killings of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, and Walter Scott. That
suffering has reignited a national debate about the way police departments
handle encounters with Black people. The way that Supreme Court decisions
have contributed to that suffering makes it clear that there are legal determinants
beyond just a few bad apples that foster injustice and suffering.

